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ABST RACT
When judges decide trademark cases, they often must balance
trademark rights against interests in free expression. The defense known
as “classic” or “descriptive” fair use embraces the foundational themes
that make trademark conflicts so compelling. By design, the defense pits
fair competition and free speech against a mark owner’s right to control
its story, reputation, and values. The outcome of this tug of war may be
hard to predict. It turns on consumer perception, and therefore, generally
raises questions of fact. But in Mars, Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co., this fact
intensive question was decided as a matter of law. The intensely
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taking the time to speak with me and guest lecture in my 2017 UNC School of Law trademark class
about the Pill Pockets/pillpouches litigation. And I am grateful to Bryan McGann for developing the
Pill Pockets treat which made the last months of our beloved Kelev’s life much more comfortable.
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competitive business of pet products sets the stage for the expressive
battle. Mars, Inc. had been using the trademark “Pill Pockets” on a
patented treat for hiding and delivering medicine to pets. When the
patents expired, The J.M. Smucker Company entered the market with
“pillpouches.” Mars sued for trademark infringement, and Smucker held
up the shield of descriptive fair use. This defense enumerates three factors
designed to help courts weigh the interests of consumers, competitors, and
mark owners. The Court granted summary judgment for the Defendant. A
close study of the strategic choices leading to the decision reveals the
critical importance of articulating the difference between the first two
elements, descriptive and trademark use of a term. They are not mutually
exclusive opposites. Understanding the particular trademark meaning of
bad faith, the third element, is necessary in order to select the best
evidence to support it. Winning such a fact intensive issue on summary
judgment is not easy. Perhaps in this case, a win could have been averted.
This Article offers a master class on descriptive fair use by examining the
parties’ litigation strategies and how they influenced the Court’s decision.

I. INT RODUCT ION
The Mars, Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co. 1 decision from the Eastern
District of Virginia provides a master class in trademark’s expressive safe
harbor known as “classic” or “descriptive” fair use. Judges deciding
trademark cases must often balance trademark rights against expressive
interests. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution may tempt us
into thinking that First Amendment expressive freedoms will always
trump statutory or common law trademark rights. But that is not always
the case. All of trademark law functions as an exception to free speech by
reserving some expressive uses exclusively for trademark owners.
Trademark fair use doctrine involves careful balancing of a mark owner’s
right to protect its reputation against the rights of competitors to compete
fairly and effectively so that consumers will have access to accurate,
informative speech that is not bounded by monopolies on descriptive
words.
Trademark litigation revolves around consumer perceptions which
often present complex questions of fact. Consequently, it is not easy to
win trademark cases on summary judgment. But they are winnable, and
the pitched battle between Mars and Smucker over the name of a pet treat
1. No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582, at *3–4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2017). (Hereinafter,
Mars, Inc. is referred to as “ Mars” and The J.M. Smucker Company is referred to as “ Smucker”).
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shows how it can be done. This article gives a master class in the
descriptive fair use defense by analyzing the litigation strategies that led
to the Court’s decision. The master class proceeds in three parts. Part I
tells the Pill Pockets story. Part II explains how the descriptive fair use
defense works to support the foundational trademark principals of fair
competition. Part III illustrates how descriptive fair use can be used to
achieve victory on summary judgment and summarizes what the Pill
Pockets story teaches about trademark selection and the descriptive fair
use defense.
II. T HE PILL POCKET S ST ORY
The conflict in Mars, Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co. involved the words
used to describe treats that surround medicine to make it more palatable
for pets. The story of the Mars product began like many entrepreneurial
successes—with an everyday crisis. Bryan McGann’s golden retriever
needed medicine and would not swallow it. 2 Bryan could get a pill in his
dog’s mouth if he delivered it in cheese, but his dog found creative ways
to eat the cheese but not the medicine. 3 This issue was far from unique. In
the late ‘90s, pet pill ingestion rates were a common problem. In trying to
find a solution, McGann learned that trying to trick his dog with food
wrapped around the medicine did not work because his dog could smell
the pill after he handled it with his fingers and then touched the
surrounding food. 4 This insight was the secret to his entrepreneurial
breakthrough. 5 McGann realized that if he formed a dog treat into a pocket
before touching the medicine, he could place the pill in the treat with one
hand and shut the treat around the medicine with the other. 6 The pill would
be wholly encased, and the treat (untouched on the outside by the
medicine) would not smell like the pill. 7 He found that with this process,
pets were much more likely to consume both the treat and the medicine.
The pocket shape was the secret to the treat’s success.
Like many entrepreneurial stories, this one had its share of delays
and obstacles. McGann sought patent counsel and found that the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) had issued a patent in
2. See Pete McEntegart, Head of Duke Startup Ventures Clinic Has Worn Many Hats,
GREP B EAT: T RIANGLE T ECH NEWS (Sep. 4, 2018), https://grepbeat.com/2018/09/04/duke-startupventures-clinic-head-has-worn-many-hats/ [https://perma.cc/S3R2-QDT9].
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
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1989 to Robert Harold for “a food product for administering medication
to animals.” 8 Harold’s patent used the words “pill pockets” to describe the
invention. 9 The patent did not encompass all of McGann’s discoveries,
but it was close enough to potentially block him from proceeding. 10
Undeterred, McGann contacted Robert Harold and learned he had been in
an accident and had not been able to devote resources to commercializing
his invention. 11 They cut a deal, and McGann purchased the patent
rights. 12 Then McGann was accepted to law school, and his patent sat in
a drawer for three years. 13
In 2000, Linda Hayden, the holder of another related patent, 14
applied to register the words “pill pocket” as a trademark for an
“[i]ngestible pouch sold empty for use in encapsulating and aiding in the
oral administration of medications and vitamins.” 15 The original
trademark application was filed based on her intent to use the mark in
commerce. 16 McGann joined forces with Linda Hayden in late 2001 after
she introduced him to investors in Colorado who agreed to fund
commercialization of their venture. 17 On September 20, 2002, Hayden
sent the USPTO a statement alleging use of the “Pill Pockets” mark in
commerce, and in 2003, she assigned the mark to Pill Pockets, Inc., the
company she formed with McGann. 18
Pill Pockets were a huge success. In 2005, S&M NuTec, the
developer and owner of the Greenies pet product brand, acquired Pill
Pockets Inc., 19 and in 2006, Mars acquired S&M NuTec, becoming the
owner of both the Greenies and Pill Pockets brands. 20
After the patents expired, the product continued to be a commercial
success. The door to competition was open and compelling. In August
8. U.S. Patent No. 4,857,333 (filed May 12, 1988)(“ The treat may be provided in a variety of
shapes and sizes as long as the treats are chewable and include pill pockets.”)(emphasis added).
9. U.S. Patent No. 4,857,33 at col. 2 11. 42-55 (filed May 12, 1988).
10. See id.
11. See McEntegart, supra note 2.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. U.S. Patent No. 6,143,316 (filed September 6, 1996).
15. PILL POCKETS, Registration No. 2,673,252.
16. See id. (application filing date: Nov. 06, 2000, registration date: Jan. 07, 2003).
17. Email from Bryan McGann to Deborah Gerhardt (Feb. 2, 2019) (on file with author).
18. Id.
19. Developer of Greenies Acquires Healthy Pet Treat for Pill Delivery, B US. W IRE (Apr. 18,
2005, 09:00 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20050418005070/en/DeveloperGreenies-Acquires-Healthy-Pet-Treat-Pill [https://perma.cc/S6HN-B9FX].
20. See Mars to Buy Greenies’ Maker S& M NuTec, P ET P RODUCT NEWS (Sep. 19, 2006, 03:47
PM),
http://www.petproductnews.com/September-2006/Mars-To-Buy-Greenies-Maker-S -M NuTec/ [https://perma.cc/RR3T-5Y8Y].
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2016, Smucker—the owner of the Milk Bone dog biscuit brand—
bulldozed through it. They began selling a competitive product called
“pillpouches.” 21 Examples of the product packaging used by both
companies appear below:

Mars decided that the product names were so similar that consumers
would be confused, and it sued Smucker for trademark infringement. 22
The resolution of the dispute provides a model for understanding and
strategically working with trademark law’s descriptive fair use defense.
II. T HE DESCRIPT IVE FAIR USE DEFENSE
The Lanham Act was enacted to promote fair competition, and
therefore, does not create unbounded monopolies. 23 Because trademark
protection creates a zone of exclusivity, Congress limited protections for
words that competitors may need to name or describe their products and
services. 24 One of the important protections available to new market
players is the descriptive fair use defense. The defense originates in
foundational trademark principles. For a trademark to be protected under
the Lanham Act, it must be “distinctive,” meaning that it must signal to
21. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Mars, Inc.
v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2017), EFC No.
25.
22. See Mars, Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582, at *1 (E.D.
Va. Sept. 27, 2017).
23. U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 198 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d sub nom. U.S.
Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., 923 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1990).
24. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 951 (7th Cir. 1992) (“ The
fair use doctrine is based on the principle that no one should be able to appropriate descriptive
language through trademark registration.”).
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consumers that the product or service comes from a particular company,
even if consumers cannot name that company. 25 If a product name is
generic, it will fail the distinctiveness test and cannot be protected as a
mark because it is incapable of signaling to a consumer that the product
comes from a particular source.
The Lanham Act prohibits the registration of generic terms. Generic
words may not be registered as trademarks because they communicate
what a product is, not who sells it. 26 If a product name becomes generic
after it is registered, federal law also provides cancellation procedures that
can be used to undo these registrations. 27 The question of whether a term
is generic depends on the context in which it is used. 28 If a product name
answers the question “What are you?,” the name is generic and may not
be protected as a mark. 29 For example, “apple” is generic for the fruit and
cannot be monopolized by any apple orchard. Trademark law protects
competition by prohibiting any one orchard from obtaining exclusive
rights in this word which all of them need. If, however, the product name
answers the question “Who are you?” or “Who vouches for you?” the
name can be distinctive and may be protected as a trademark. 30 While
“apple” may not be a mark for apples, it can be registered for computers,
because other sellers of computers do not need to use the word “apple” to
describe or name their goods.
Creators of new unique products must be careful that their product
names do not become known as generic synonyms for the products. The
meaning of a term and its ability to send a distinctive trademark signal
may change over time as consumer perceptions evolve. Product names
that were once federally registered trademarks but are now considered
generic and available to competitors include: yo-yo, aspirin, escalator, and
trampoline. 31
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2012).
26. See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th
Cir. 1999) (“ [T]he name of the product or service itself—what [the product] is, and as such . . . the
very antithesis of a mark.”).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012).
28. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (“ [A] term
that is in one category for a particular product may be in quite a different one for another.”).
29. See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc., 198 F.3d at 1147.
30. Id.
31. See Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655, 668 (7th Cir. 1965)
(holding that “ yo-yo” is no longer a valid trademark); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 515–
16 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (allowing competitor to market its drug to the public under the term Aspirin since
the word had already entered into public domain); Commissioner of Patents, Haughton Elevator Co.
v. Seeberger, etc., 40 T RADEMARK R EP . 326, 326–27 (1950) (cancelling 50-year-old registration fo r
Escalator); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Am. Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745, 755–56 (S.D. Iowa
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The Lanham Act also limits trademark rights in descriptive terms. 32
In addition to being more difficult to obtain, these trademarks are more
difficult to enforce. The Act poses a high burden when an applicant seeks
to register a descriptive mark in order to avoid unfair monopolies on
words that competitors need to define their products and services. A mark
will be deemed descriptive if it “conveys an immediate idea of the
ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods.” 33 In trademark law,
a word or design may be classified as descriptive if it references any
feature of the claimed goods and services, such as an ingredient, flavor,
quality, characteristic, function, purpose, or use of the specified goods or
services. 34 A mark need not name the product or even a visual feature to
be deemed descriptive. For example, the USPTO found that “apple pie”
was descriptive of potpourri that was designed to smell like apple pie. 35
Because the term described the product’s purpose—to emit the scent of
apple pie—the mark was deemed merely descriptive and unregistrable. 36
Marks that fall into this category are weaker than other marks. When a
mark incorporates a descriptive term, the USPTO generally requires an
applicant to disclaim any exclusive right in the descriptive word. An
applicant who registered “Apple Twister” for a sweet apple treat was first
required to state that it did not claim any exclusive right to the word
“apple.” 37
The Lanham Act permits registration of descriptive marks only if the
applicant provides evidence that although the words are descriptive, they
still signal that the applicant is the source. 38 Exclusive use of the
descriptive words for five years may be sufficient proof. 39 Federal
trademark applications composed entirely of descriptive terms are
generally denied registration unless the applicant submits evidence of
acquired distinctiveness, also known as secondary meaning. 40 An
application to register “Crispy Apple Fries” for dried apples was denied
because the mark “merely describes a feature and ingredient of applicant’s
1961) (holding that the term Trampoline is “ generic and in the public domain and cannot be
exclusively appropriated for trademark usage”).
32. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976).
33. Id. at 11 (quoting Stix Prods. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 259 F. Supp. 479, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
34. See In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
35. Id. at 1216–17.
36. Id. at 1218.
37. APPLE TWISTER, Registration No. 4,432,856
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2012).
39. Id. § 1052(f).
40. J. T HOMAS MCC ARTHY, MCC ARTHY ON T RADEMARKS AND UNFAIR C OMPETITION § 15.1
(4th ed. 2017).
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goods” and the applicant did not submit evidence that consumers
perceived the mark as a source identifier. 41 A mark that fails to qualify for
the Principal Register may be placed on the less desirable Supplemental
Register. 42 When an applicant cannot establish that its mark is inherently
distinctive, the mark may still obtain a place on the Supplemental
Register. 43 If the mark ever acquires secondary meaning, the applicant
may reapply to register the term. 44
Once the applicant demonstrates that consumers consider the
descriptive mark to be distinctive, the mark may be moved to the Principal
Register. Owners of registered marks may assert trademark infringement
claims if a competitor uses the mark in a way that causes confusion about
the source, sponsorship, or affiliation between the mark owner and the
new entrant. 45 A parallel provision in the Lanham Act permits trademark
infringement claims to be asserted even for descriptive marks that have
not been federally registered if the mark owner can prove the term is
commercially distinctive. 46
Trademark law provides several fair use defenses for protecting
businesses that use words which others have registered as trademarks. The
nominative fair use defense protects those who use another’s trademark
to refer to the trademark owner or its products. 47 This defense would
protect a teacher who provides lessons on how to use Apple software, as
long as she used Apple’s marks only to describe her services and not in a
way that falsely suggests sponsorship or an affiliation with the company.
The descriptive fair use defense applies in a different context, where
the junior user is using a descriptive word to explain its own product rather
than referring to the senior user. It shields competitors from liability when
they use descriptive words in good faith to explain their own product
features, even if those same descriptive words have been claimed by a
competitor as a trademark. 48 Section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act created
this safe harbor from infringement liability when words or symbols are
used “otherwise than as a mark, . . . [as] a term or device which is
41. Office Action, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 87/124,023 (filed Aug. 2, 2016).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (2012).
43. Id. § 1095.
44. See id.
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2012).
46. See id. § 1125(a).
47. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 228 (3d Cir. 2005);
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
48. U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 197–98 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d sub
nom. U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., 923 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1990) (“ The purpose of the defense is to
prevent the trademark rights of one party from being extended to preclude another party from the
description of his product to the public.”).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss3/4

8

Gerhardt: Fair Use Defense

2018]

F AIR USE DEFENSE

795

descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods
or services of such party[.]” 49
Given the Lanham Act’s recognition of the descriptive fair use
defense, any business that chooses descriptive words for its mark must
accept the foreseeable market consequences. The words in descriptive
marks always remain vulnerable to competitive uses. Therefore,
descriptive marks are incapable of having a protectable and unique space
in a competitive field. By choosing a descriptive mark, a brand owner
assumes the risk that its words may be used by its competitors. McCarthy
explains this risk as follows:
By choosing a descriptive term, the trademark owner must live with the
result that everyone else in the marketplace remains free to use the term
in its original “primary” or descriptive sense. A junior user is always
entitled to use a descriptive term in good faith in its primary, descriptive
sense other than as a trademark. The only right of exclusion that trademark law creates in a descriptive word is in the secondary, new, “trademark” meaning of the word that plaintiff has created. The original, descriptive primary meaning is always available for use by others to
describe their goods, in the interest of free competition. 50

Given the defense, the burden of protecting descriptive marks is
higher than it would be for a more distinctive term. Even if a mark owner
proves that a new entrant’s use is confusing, the expressive fair use
defense may protect the use. As the Supreme Court explained in KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression, “the common law of
unfair competition also tolerated some degree of confusion from
a descriptive use of words contained in another person’s trademark.”51
Tolerating some confusing uses is the price an applicant must pay for
choosing a descriptive term as a mark. “When the plaintiff chooses a mark
with descriptive qualities, the fair use doctrine recognizes that ‘he cannot
altogether exclude some kinds of competing uses,’ particularly those
which use words in their primary descriptive and non-trademark sense.”52
While descriptive marks send both descriptive and source-signifying
messages, a new entrant charged with infringement must demonstrate its
use is only descriptive.

49. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012).
50. J. T HOMAS MCC ARTHY, MCC ARTHY ON T RADEMARKS AND UNFAIR C OMPETITION §
11.45 (5th ed. 2018).
51. 543 U.S. 111, 119 (2004).
52. U.S. Shoe, 740 F. Supp. at 198 (quoting Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 12 (2d Cir.1976)).
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The descriptive fair use defense permits mark owners to protect the
secondary brand meaning they created while still permitting everyone else
to use the same words for their original descriptive meaning. 53 Trademark
infringement matters can play out differently when brought by owners of
descriptive marks. In these cases, courts often tolerate more confusion,
because the senior user’s trademark interests are balanced against the
competitor’s expressive interest in truthfully describing its product to
consumers.
III. ST RAT EGIC LESSONS

ON EACH

DESCRIPT IVE FAIR USE ELEMENT

Descriptive fair use is an affirmative defense that trademark
defendants may use to shield themselves from infringement liability. To
gain its protection, a junior user must establish three elements: that it used
the contested words “(1) other than as a mark, (2) in a descriptive sense,
and (3) in good faith.” 54 This section examines each of these three
elements separately to illustrate strategic lessons that may be drawn from
Smucker’s effective use of this defense and Mars’s failure to defeat it.
A.

Descriptive Use

In asserting a descriptive fair use defense, a junior user must prove it
is using its mark descriptively but not as a mark. Determining the
difference between trademark and descriptive use can be tricky. In order
to analyze the defense correctly, one must be careful to distinguish the
first two prongs of the test and not to conflate them into one. Trademark
use occurs when a symbol reflects a product’s source or origin. 55
Descriptive use occurs when one uses a term that describes the product’s
“qualities, ingredients or characteristics” 56 or “an action the alleged
infringer hopes consumers will make” 57 with the product. While the senior
user’s mark may both describe the product and indicate source, the junior
user’s fair use defense depends on the ability to prove that the use is

53. Id. at 199 (“ A user of a descriptive word may acquire the exclusive right to use that
descriptive word as an identifier of the product or source. This, however, does not justify barring
others from using the words in good faith for descriptive purposes pertinent to their products.”
(emphasis in original)).
54. Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 303 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting JA Apparel Corp. v.
Abboud, 568 F.3d 390, 400 (2d Cir. 2009)).
55. Dessert Beauty, Inc. v. Fox, 568 F. Supp. 2d 416, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 329 F. App’x
333 (2d Cir. 2009).
56. In re Colonial Stores Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
57. Dessert Beauty, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 425 (quoting EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday,
Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 65 (2d Cir. 2000)).
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descriptive but not a trademark use that signals source. Therefore, in
assessing descriptive fair use, it is important to keep in mind that
descriptive use and trademark use can coexist, but if a defendant engages
in both uses, it will not be able to take advantage of the defense. 58
For the first element of the descriptive fair use test, a finding that the
defendant engaged in descriptive use of the contested term is a necessary
prerequisite. Descriptive fair use may be predicated on any use that
proclaims a product feature. Courts examine this question contextually by
considering the meaning of the word, how it relates to the particular
product or service, and whether it is used descriptively. Although courts
have attempted to develop heuristics to answer this question, there are no
litmus tests. However, there are some factors that may impact a finding of
descriptiveness.
The typicality of a phrase may suggest descriptiveness. When a
cosmetics company used the words “Seal it with a Kiss” in a promotional
activity instructing consumers to seal a complimentary postcard with a
kiss using its lipstick, 59 the Court held that use of this common phrase was
descriptive because it was used to “describe an action that the sellers hope
consumers will take, using their product.” 60 The common use of the
phrase in this context was a factor the Court weighed in favor of
descriptiveness.
Use of a visually prominent and well known house mark sometimes
suggests that consumers would consider smaller less noticeable text to be
used descriptively. 61 In U.S. Shoe v. Brown and Dessert Beauty v. Fox, the
courts indicated that the use of more prominent and famous house marks
would lead consumers to perceive the challenged words as descriptive62
The use of the word “inhibitor” (a competitor’s mark) in connection with
58. Sorensen v. WD-40 Co., 792 F.3d 712, 723 (7th Cir. 2015) (“ [A]s McCarthy makes clear,
the use of a term by other sellers of similar goods is an indicia of the descriptiveness of the term, not
of its being used in a non-trademark manner.” (quoting MCC ARTHY, supra note 40 § 11.20)).
59. Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30 (2d
Cir. 1997).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 30–31. See Schafer Co. v. Innco Mgmt. Corp., 995 F.2d 1064 (4th Cir.
1993), aff’g 797 F. Supp. 477 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (granting defendant summary judgment based on the
conclusion that defendant’s use was descriptive fair use because the use reflected a descriptive
meaning that preexisted the plaintiff’s trademark, the term did not resemble plaintiff’s visual depiction
of its trademark, and defendant prominently displayed its own tradename and logo in connection with
the challenged term).
62. U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 197 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d sub nom. U.S.
Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., 923 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1990) (“ The ad includes the NaturalSport logo, the
slogan, Walk Our Way and the words From Naturalizer, which defendant uses to advertise other
styles of shoe in the NaturalSport line.”); see Dessert Beauty, Inc. v. Fox, 568 F. Supp. 2d 416, 421
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 329 F. App’x 333 (2d Cir. 2009).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 4

798

AKRON LAW R EVIEW

[52:787

its WD-40 mark was insulated from liability based on descriptive fair
use. 63 The Court noted that “inhibitor” described a product feature and the
packaging displayed the well-known WD-40 mark in larger, more
prominent typeface. 64
Mars’s counsel might have earned some credibility with the Court by
conceding that the term “pillpouches” is descriptive of the defendant’s
product. As noted above, descriptiveness can be predicated on a product’s
purpose or function, and Smucker’s product was intended to be used to
form a pouch to hold a pill. Mars would not concede even this element.
Instead, Mars argued that “pillpouches” was misdescriptive because
the Smucker’s product comes out of the bag as a tube and must be formed
into a pouch after a consumer takes it from the package. 65 Unlike Mars’s
Pill Pockets, Smucker’s product must be pinched at both ends. 66 The
argument was a good one, (and will be revisited in discussing the third
fair use prong), but it was not effective here given trademark doctrine’s
broad view of descriptiveness. Ultimately, a consumer would pinch one
end of the Smucker’s treat to form a pouch. Based on loads of precedent,
one might easily conclude that pill pouches described a purpose for which
Smucker’s intended consumers to use its product. Given this precedent,
Mars’s strategy on this element was not well conceived. Its conception of
descriptiveness failed to embrace the idea that a product may be
descriptive it if identifies the purpose for using a product.
The District Court found Smucker’s use of “pillpouches” to be
descriptive, noting that it “alludes to that term’s primary meaning to
describe the product’s . . . function.” 67 The misdescriptive argument was
not a winning strategy, partly because Mars and its predecessors in interest
had used both “pill” and “pouch” to describe their product. The Hayden
patent referred to a “pill” pocket for delivering medicine. 68 The Pill
Pockets trademark application used the words “pill pouches” as a generic
synonym in its description of goods and services. 69 And as illustrated

63. Sorensen v. WD-40 Co., 792 F.3d 712, 724 (7th Cir. 2015) (“ Due to the word’s small size,
plain color, and non-privileged placement on the bottle, we find that ‘inhibitor’ is not an ‘attentiongetting symbol,’ and does not function as a source indicator.”).
64. See id.
65. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 25-26, Mars, Inc. v.
J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2017), EFC No. 27.
66. See id.
67. Mars, Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582, at *3 (E.D. Va.
Sept. 27, 2017).
68. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,143,316 at col. 5 (filed Sept. 6, 1996).
69. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/034,057 (filed Nov. 6, 2000) (describing the
goods as an “ ingestible pouch”).
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below, Mars’s Pill Pockets packaging uses both the words “pill” and
“pouch” to describe features of its own product. 70
Mars had also approved the use of “pill pouches” as a generic
synonym. When a trademark applicant described its Champion Treats
product as a “pill pocket” in a trademark application, Mars objected, but
dropped its opposition when the applicant changed the description of its
product to a “pill pouch.” 71 Based on this history, a competitor trying to
select a generic synonym for the “pill pocket” may have (and in this case
did) settle on using “pill pouches.” Given that Mars’s own packaging used
these words descriptively, it had to strike the Court as a bit odd that it was
arguing that the same words misdescribed a competitor’s product that was
used for the very same purpose.
Smucker’s lawyers effectively directed the Court’s attention to all of
this substantial evidence of descriptive use. The Court was so impressed
by these assertions that it seemed to conclude that the high level of
descriptiveness was enough to establish the defense. 72 The Court
concluded:
Smucker’s use of the term ‘pill pouches’ alludes to that term’s primary
meaning to describe the product’s design, function, and characteristics;
the visual appearances of Smucker’s Pill Pouches label and
Mars’s Pill Pockets mark are dissimilar; and Smucker’s product prominently displays the MILK–BONE name and logo to avoid consumer
confusion as to origin.73

70. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 9–10, Mars,
Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2017), EFC
No. 25.
71. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86/828,963 (filed Nov. 23, 2015) (CHAMPION
TREATS and design).
72. Mars, 2017 WL 4323582, at *3.
73. Id.
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Instead of arguing that the Smucker’s mark was misdescriptive, Mars
could have argued that even if the Court found the mark to be descriptive,
that did not preclude a finding that the product name was being used as a
mark. Mars could have conceded the first factor, and focused the Court’s
attention on the second two elements of the descriptive fair use defense.
Mars failed to convince the Court that descriptive use and use as a mark
are not mutually exclusive. These concepts are not and should not be
thought of as “two sides of the same coin.” 74 Sometimes they coexist. 75
Sometimes they do not. All descriptive use cases involve at least one
mark—the plaintiff’s—that is both descriptive and used as a mark. Most
often, if the products are competitive and plaintiff’s use is descriptive,
defendant’s use will be descriptive too. That the defendant’s use is
descriptive should not be deemed dispositive. It is important to conduct a
separate analysis of the first two descriptive fair use elements, because
even if a term is found to be descriptive, it may fail the second element if
it also used as a mark. Perhaps Mars’s biggest strategic error was that it
failed to illuminate that distinction.
B.

Use as a Mark

The second element requires analysis of whether the contested term
is used as a mark. 76 Unlike the first element of descriptiveness, a
defendant who fails this element cannot take advantage of the defense.
One must determine whether consumers would view the term, as used, to
signal source or merely to explain a product feature. Like descriptiveness,
this element requires analysis of contextual use and may raise many
questions of fact.
Courts have adopted a variety of approaches to decide whether a term
is used as a mark. Some are more helpful than others. One Court examined
“whether the defendant is using the ‘term as a symbol to attract public
attention.’” 77 That is a bit of an odd standard because everything in an ad
74. William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. R EV. 49, 85, n. 194
(2008) (citing Whirlpool Props., Inc. v. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc., No. 1:03-cv-414, 2005 WL 3088339,
at *20 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 2005) “ The first issue is whether defendant used the
term descriptively and not as a trademark. These questions are really two sides of the same coin.”).
75. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 953–54 (7th Cir. 1992)
(explaining it would be inaccurate to claim that “ a descriptive term can never function as a trademark.
Such a rule would not only conflate two of the three elements of fair use, it would also be contrary to
the well-established doctrine that a descriptive term is protectable as a trademark to the extent it has
developed secondary meaning.”).
76. Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 303 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting JA Apparel Corp. v.
Abboud, 568 F.3d 390, 400 (2d Cir. 2009)).
77. Id. at 306 (quoting JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 568 F.3d at 400 (2d Cir. 2009)).
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is designed to attract attention and would not likely help separate
descriptive from source-identifying content. More helpfully, the second
and seventh circuits have considered whether the term was used once or
repeatedly across a series of products and services. 78
Mars tried this approach. It did not work because Smucker argued
that it was using the term as a generic product name, and therefore needed
to repeat it for different sizes and flavors.
Repetition across multiple product types is the kind of repeated use
that signals a term is used to communicate the source of the entire line.
Use across multiple flavors of one product does not carry the same weight.
It can just as easily state what a product is, and not who sells it. Mars
offered no evidence that Smucker used “pill pouches” on a variety of
different products.
Use of descriptive terms in conjunction with a famous house mark
may still constitute use as a mark. For example, when Gatorade used a
competitor’s mark, Thirst Aid, in the slogan Gatorade is Thirst Aid, the
Court found the use to be as a mark, notwithstanding the prominent use
of the house mark. 79 Mars did not use this decision as an analogy to make
that point.
There are not many clear signals that use of a phrase is not as a mark,
but to the extent they exist, they were largely absent in this case. One clear
indicator is when the challenged term is imbedded in other descriptive text
and is not bolded, enlarged, or otherwise set out against surrounding
words. 80 If the words appear in a textual description similar in size and
style to other descriptive text, a court may find that the term is less likely
to be perceived as a mark. 81 In U.S. Shoe v. Brown, the plaintiff owned
the mark “Looks Like a Pump, Feels Like a Sneaker,” for women’s
shoes. 82 The defendant ran an ad stating, “Think Of It As A Sneaker With

78. Compare id. at 309 (holding that use across an event, a magazine and with “ ‘first-ever’ of
its kind” language suggested brand use), with Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 633
(7th Cir. 2001) (finding the Chicago Tribune did not use plaintiff’s registered mark “ The Joy of Sex”
as a mark when, after the Bulls won their sixth basketball championship, it published a newspaper
headline proclaiming “ The Joy of Six,” and printed the headline on promotional merchandise which
included this headline and the name of the paper).
79. Sands, 978 F.2d at 954.
80. R ESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF UNFAIR C OMPETITION § 28 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (“Use
of a descriptive term in textual . . . instructions . . . is ordinarily a fair use.”).
81. See U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d sub
nom. U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., 923 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1990) (“ Defendant’s use of the words
‘feels like a sneaker’ is not even as a caption or slogan, but as a fragment of a sentence in small print.
In short, defendant uses the words ‘otherwise than as a trade or service mark[.]’”); Dessert Beauty,
Inc. v. Fox, 568 F. Supp. 2d 416, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 329 F. App’x 333 (2d Cir. 2009).
82. U.S. Shoe Corp., 740 F. Supp. at 196.
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No Strings Attached.” 83 The ad includes the phrase, “And when we say it
feels like a sneaker, we’re not just stringing you along.” 84 Similarly,
placing a term adjacent to larger, more prominent brand signifiers weighs
against brand perception. 85 When defending against a claim that a term
lacks distinctiveness, failing to set off the size of one’s own mark in
contrast to those of others may lessen the perception that the word is used
as a mark, even if it appears in stylized text. In Frosty Treats, the Court
noted that the use of stylized text that was similar in size to text in other
styles did not advance the plaintiff’s claim that the descriptive term was
perceived as a trademark. 86
When the disputed term is visually prominent, courts often find that
such use tilts the balance towards use as a mark. 87 The size and style of
the typeface in relation to surrounding text may signal brand significance.
It is unusual to obtain summary judgment on descriptive fair use when a
mark is displayed as prominently as the pill pouches designation. If a word
on a label or package is set off in a different font, on a colored background,
and is among the largest text on a package, the visual impact generally
signals to consumers that the words have brand meaning. 88 Visual
prominence can carry significant persuasive force. Capitalization appears
to matter as well. 89 Marks are often, but not always, capitalized. The

83. Id. at 197.
84. Id.
85. See Sorensen v. WD-40 Co., 792 F.3d 712, 724 (7th Cir. 2015) (“ Due to the word’s small
size, plain color, and non-privileged placement on the bottle, we find that ‘inhibitor’ is not an
‘attention-getting symbol,’ and does not function as a source indicator.”).
86. See Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 1001, 1004-05 (8th
Cir. 2005) (“ There is no indication in the record that the survey respondents (apart from the one
percent) were familiar with the vans because of the small nine-by-four-inch ‘Frosty Treats’ decal on
the rear portion of the side of the van, the only place where the phrase ‘Frosty Treats’ appears on the
vehicle. This decal, moreover, is surrounded by numerous other decals comprising the van’s menu
board.”).
87. See Tree Tavern Prods., Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 1263, 1269 (D. Del. 1986)
(finding that Side Dish for One was used as a trademark, and not descriptively, based on “ prominent
positioning . . . meant to attract the consumer’s attention . . . . The phrase’s bold lettering is the largest
on the package. It is set off from both the house mark and the generic description, and modifies the
generic description of each individual product.”).
88. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 938 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding the
words Brew Nuts were used as a mark based on packaging in which the words were “ much larger
than the other lettering on the package and in a different type style. The words are set off in a
distinctive red-brown oval, outlined in dark brown and topped by a conspicuous white circle
containing a picture of an overflowing beer stein. Below or above the oval, depending on the particular
package, is the phrase actually used to describe the product: ‘sweetened salted peanuts.’”).
89. See Adidas Am., Inc. v. Skechers USA, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-01741-HZ, 2017 WL 3319190,
at *24 (D. Or. Aug. 3, 2017) (use of Adidas mark “ SUPERNOVA” in “ all caps” deemed to be a
trademark use).
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absence of capitalization may signal that a term is generic or descriptive. 90
Use of a term just before a less prominent generic product name may also
be deemed to signal source. 91 It is difficult to discern why Mars did not
rely more heavily on the prominent visual appearance of “pillpouches” on
Smucker’s packaging. Prominent visual appearance of words in relation
to other content on a package is often important in determining whether
words are used as a mark. 92
The blending of two words into one can influence perception as a
mark, especially when the term is also set off in a different and prominent
typeface as this one was. 93 The lack of a space between “pill” and
“pouches” on Smucker’s packaging could have been used by Mars to
press this point. Mars did not include this argument in its summary
judgment motion. Smucker’s packaging may have led the Court to deny
summary judgment. The words “pillpouches” appear together as one word
set off from the surrounding text. They also appear in the center of the
package where one expects to see a mark, and in nearly the same position
where the “Pill Pockets” mark appears on Mars’ package. The similarity
of the marks and packaging, taken with this use that could be perceived
as a mark, may have been enough for many courts to summarily deny
summary judgment on the ground that these facts alone would be
sufficient to send the questions of confusion and descriptive fair use to a
jury.
Instead, Mars drew the Court’s attention to other lines in which
Smucker prints its trademarks in a manner that is visually similar to its
use of “pillpouches.” This strategy has been used effectively to convince
courts to deny summary judgment in descriptive fair use cases. 94 The
argument may have been effective if Mars did not also use both generic
and trademark product names in a visually similar way. Mars could have
planned ahead for that vulnerability (or tossed this argument in favor of
one that might be more fruitful), but they did not. Smucker’s counsel did
90. See Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. v. Princeton Vanguard, LLC, 124 U.S.P.Q.2d 1184, *6-10
(T.T.A.B. Sept. 6, 2017) (noting the “ many instances in the record where the term ‘pretzel crisp’ is
set forth in lower case” and citing this fact as indicative of a descriptive term since other brand names
were routinely capitalized).
91. See Beer Nuts, 711 F.2d at 938.
92. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 124 n.6
(2004) (explaining that “ the fair use analysis of KP’s employment of the stylized version o f
‘microcolor’ on its brochure may differ from that of its use of the term on the bottles and flyers”).
93. But see, in re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding screenwipe
generic).
94. See Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025,
1040 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding a question of fact based in part on the use of Delicious in a remarkabl y
similar way to how Victoria’s Secret “ uses two of its own trademarks—PINK and VERY SEXY.”).
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have a plan. They waited. This strategic decision was effective because
instead of arguing up front that this practice was common in the industry,
they opened the door for Mars to make much out of Smucker’s use of
similar typeface for its registered marks and “pillpouches.” Mars’s
counsel ran right through that door, without acknowledging that this
practice was common in the industry and on Mars’s own products.
Smucker’s reply brief showed that Mars itself displayed generic and
trademarked product names in similar typeface. This evidence diffused
Mars’s argument and did not reflect well on the credibility of its counsel.
Use of the “TM” or “SM” symbol is perhaps the best evidence that a
term will be understood as a mark. Courts frequently note that the absence
of any notice and the choice not to file a trademark application may be
viewed as evidence that the word or symbol was not intended to be used
to designate source. 95 While the presence of a trademark notice or
application may be dispositive, the absence generally is not deemed to
carry decisive weight. But Mars gave the Court so little to work with on
this prong that the Court simply noted that Smucker did not use the “TM”
symbol adjacent to the term “pillpouches” 96 and never applied to register
the term as a trademark with the USPTO. The Court did not discuss the
visual prominence of “pillpouches.”
After noting that the company had not claimed trademark rights in
“pillpouches,” 97 the decision jumps to a discussion of the descriptive
nature of the words without genuinely addressing whether a question of
fact exists on whether consumers would perceive “pillpouches” as a brand
due to its visual prominence on the package. The Court stated:
Smucker does not have a registered trademark for Pill Pouches. Smucker
does not use a ™ designation on its Pill Pouches label. See George &
Co., 575 F.3d at 401 (“While not dispositive, the absence of a ™
designation is telling.”). Smucker’s use of the term “pill pouches” is not
used to indicate either Smucker or Mars as the source of the product, but
rather to describe the purpose, function, and characteristics of the
product. 98

This conclusion suggests the Court did not consider whether the
“pillpouches” could be both descriptive and perceived as a brand.
Virtually all uses subject to this defense will be descriptive. By conceding
95. See George & Co. v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 401 (“ While not dispositive,
the absence of a ™ designation is telling.”).
96. See Mars, Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582, at *3 (E.D.
Va. Sept. 27, 2017).
97. Id.
98. Id.
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that point, Mars may have been able to focus the Court’s attention more
directly on this second prong. By failing to clarify that a term can be both
descriptive and used as a mark, Mars missed an opportunity to overcome
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
C.

Bad Faith

The third descriptive fair use factor precludes application of the
defense if a defendant uses another’s mark in bad faith. In trademark law,
a finding of bad faith requires proof that the junior user intentionally and
unfairly tried to profit by using the plaintiff’s mark. 99 For example, bad
faith may be predicated on facts showing that a plaintiff selected a mark
because it knew the designation would trick consumers into believing that
its products are sourced or sponsored by someone else. 100 Knowledge of
another’s mark is not enough to establish bad faith. 101 For this reason,
actual knowledge of a senior user’s prominent use or constructive
knowledge based on a federal trademark registration are both insufficient
to establish bad faith. 102 Similarly, continued use of a descriptive term
after receiving a cease and desist letter will not support a finding of bad
faith if the junior user has a strong argument that its use was not confusing
or is protected by a trademark defense. 103 Uses that may remind
consumers of a senior user’s product are also not necessarily in bad faith
if consumers are not likely to be confused about sponsorship, affiliation,
or source. 104 Evidence that packaging was designed to minimize the
chance of consumer confusion can neutralize an allegation of bad faith.
Therefore, use of a house mark or a visually different package design can
demonstrate a junior user’s good faith intent to distinguish its product. 105

99. EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 66 (2d
Cir. 2000) (“ Courts and commentators who have considered the question equate a lack of good fait h
with the subsequent user’s intent to trade on the good will of the trademark holder by creating
confusion as to source or sponsorship.”).
100. Dessert Beauty, Inc. v. Fox, 568 F. Supp. 2d 416, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 329 F. App’x
333 (2d Cir. 2009).
101. Person’s Co., Ltd. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see Dessert Beauty,
568 F. Supp. 2d at 427 (stating that mere knowledge of the plaintiff’s trademark does not equate to a
“ lack of good faith without additional evidence supporting an inference of bad faith”).
102. See Dessert Beauty, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
103. See, e.g., Wonder Labs, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 728 F. Supp. 1058, 1064 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (granting summary judgment for defendant on the ground that its use of “ the dentists’ choice”
was descriptive fair use, despite plaintiff’s assertion of bad faith due to failure to cease and desist use
of its mark Dentists Choice).
104. See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 117 (2d Cir. 2009).
105. See Dessert Beauty, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 427-28.
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Mars claimed “that Smucker’s use was in bad faith due to its failure
to cease and desist the launch of its Pill Pouches product upon receiving
Mars’s cease and desist letter.” 106 The Court correctly held that such
knowledge of a plaintiff’s mark and infringement claim is not “sufficient
to constitute bad faith where the terms used by both parties are
descriptive.” 107 That allegation had been found by other courts to be an
insufficient basis to find even a question of fact. Based on that precedent
and Smucker’s use of its house marks on different color packaging, the
Court found that there was not a question of fact on whether Smucker
acted in bad faith. 108
Mars missed an opportunity to offer much better evidence of bad
faith. Here, the misdescriptive argument might have mattered. Mars could
have asserted that Smucker attempted to deceive the public by choosing a
mark nearly identical to “Pill Pockets” with words that describe Mars’s
product but misdescribe its own product. From the beginning, Bryan
McGann claimed that the pocket is the key to the treat’s success in the
market. The packaging gave clear instructions to “fill,” “pinch,” and
“give” the treat so that the pet would not taste or smell the medicine. 109
That instruction and the graphic were copied by Smucker as well. 110 While
the Mars treat comes out of the package in the form of a pocket (or pouch),
the Smucker’s version does not. It is a tube, open at both ends. Its shape
does not facilitate easy hiding of the medicine from a pet, but use of the
word “pouch” may deceive consumers into thinking it does. Smucker
could have chosen a product name that was far less similar such as “pill
treats” or “medicine traps.” Instead, it chose a product name that was
nearly identical to Mars’s trademark. Mars could have argued that this
choice raised a question of fact about whether Smucker deliberately chose
its name to confuse consumers into thinking that “pillpouches” were part
of the “Pill Pockets” product line. While this argument may not have been
a silver bullet, if pressed, it may have been effective at convincing the
Court that important questions of fact should have led to a denial of
summary judgment.

106. Mars, Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582, at *4 (E.D. Va.
Sept. 27, 2017).
107. Id. at *3-4 (citing Wonder Labs, 728 F. Supp. at 1064).
108. See id.
109. See Answer and Counterclaims at 17, Mars, Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451,
2017 WL 4323582 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2017) (depicting the back of both Mars’s and Smucker’s
packaging which both illustrate a “ fill,” “ pinch,” and “ give” instruction), EFC No. 13.
110. See id.
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Instead, the Court noted more general attributes of the competitive
packaging, such as the different colors and use of famous house marks.111
Ignoring (or missing) the misdescriptive and copied elements on
Smucker’s packaging, the Court held that it was designed to avoid tricking
consumers into thinking the product came from any source other than its
well-known line of dog treats. 112 It pointed out that “the visual
appearances
of
Smucker’s
Pill
Pouches label
and
Mars’s Pill Pockets mark are dissimilar; and Smucker’s product
prominently displays the MILK–BONE name and logo to avoid consumer
confusion as to origin.” 113 One is left to wonder if the missed opportunity
resulted from a failure to understand that knowledge from receipt of a
cease and desist letter was not enough. Mars had better evidence of bad
faith. While the mystery of why they did not aggressively assert it remains
unanswered, this missed opportunity is one of the lessons from this master
class in descriptive fair use.
IV. LESSONS

FROM

T HE MAST ER CLASS

The first lesson from this master class can be applied at the point of
selecting a mark for new product. From the beginning, entrepreneurs
should confront the foreseeable market consequences of choosing a
descriptive mark for a new product or service. Descriptive marks are
weak. The Lanham Act’s descriptive fair use defense guarantees
competitors will have the right to use terms in the mark for their primary
descriptive meaning. 114 Therefore, descriptive marks can never be as
commercially distinctive as suggestive, arbitrary or fanciful marks.
Because of their weak quality as source identifiers, the zone of protection
is narrow. Proving that use of an identical word is infringing will be a
steep uphill battle. When the junior user chooses a similar descriptive
synonym, the task may be even more difficult and not worth the fight.
Even before conducting its fair use analysis, the Smucker’s Court noted
Mars’s purported rights protect it only from nearly identical trademarks.
As the United States Supreme Court held, “[i]f any confusion results, that
is a risk the plaintiff accepted when it decided to identify its product with
a mark that uses a well-known descriptive phrase.” 115 In such
circumstances, trademarks that incorporate even minor differences—a test
111. See Mars, 2017 WL 4323582, at *2-3.
112. Id. at *3.
113. Id. at *2.
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012); MCC ARTHY, supra note 50 § 11.45.
115. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122 (2004)
(discussing “ fair use” of common terms).
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that Smucker readily passes—are sufficient to withstand infringement
claims. 116
Given this precedent, entrepreneurs should prepare for the day when
competitors enter the market. When naming a new patented product, the
best practice is to designate a generic word for future competitors that is
different from the mark. Had Mars done so, they might have appealed the
District Court’s decision. But often the best defense is a strong offense.
Smucker’s counsel responded to the lawsuit by asserting that the
plaintiff’s “Pill Pockets” mark is perceived by consumers as a generic
product name and should not be protected by trademark law at all. 117
Interestingly, Mars did not appeal its loss on summary judgment. Perhaps
they knew that continued litigation would make “Pill Pockets” vulnerable
to a challenge that the term was generic, and not protectable at all as a
trademark. Had they preselected a generic synonym for future competitive
use, their mark would not have been so vulnerable. It is possible that
Smucker conducted a pre-litigation search of their patent and trademark
applications for evidence of safe synonym, and chose “pill pouches” as
their generic product name.
Another interesting question is whether Mars’s counsel ever made a
genuine assessment of Mars’s likelihood of success. For example, did they
check the source of defendant’s descriptive words? Did they look to see
if their packaging, patent, or trademark applications used a generic
synonym, and if so, whether those were the very words Mars dedicated to
its future competitors? Did Mars conduct a survey? If they conducted a
survey before the suit was filed, where was their evidence in the summary
judgment proceedings? The absence of any survey evidence strongly
suggested that Mars did a survey, and it did not help them. 118 If that is so,
why did they bring suit, and then why didn’t they settle? All trademark
questions are ultimately decided on consumer impressions. If only the
defendant has a survey witness, and that expert will testify that the rate of
confusion is 0.0%, a defendant, as Mars learned, will not even need the
descriptive fair use defense to succeed.
This case also teaches future plaintiffs to make sure your competitor
did not take its descriptive product name from your own patent or product

116. See Mars, 2017 WL 4323582, at *3-4.
117. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, Mars,
Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2017), EFC
No. 25.
118. Mars, 2017 WL 4323582, at *2 (explaining that although survey evidence is not strictly
necessary to prove likelihood of confusion, “ the lack of such a survey can greatly hinder the plaintiff’s
case since the plaintiff has the burden of proof”).
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packaging. If a mark owner unintentionally dedicates a generic synonym
to its competitors in its own descriptive text, it will be hard pressed to
show that it is asserting a claim only against unfair competition when it
tries to prevent a competitor from using the same descriptive words.
Perhaps the most interesting and surprising lesson for trademark
doctrine is that use of large attractive text is not a deal-breaker for winning
summary judgment based on the descriptive fair use defense. Because
generic product names also may be set off to attract consumer attention,
such use does not compel a finding that the words are used as a mark. Use
of this practice in the industry can be especially compelling evidence to
support this contention. If, like Smucker’s counsel, one finds such use in
the plaintiff’s own product lines, the argument may become difficult to
overcome.
When I first saw the factual basis for the case, I thought summary
judgment would be denied. That Smucker selected such a similar
designation and featured it so prominently led me to think a descriptive
fair use defense might fail on the second or third prong of the test. That
didn’t happen, and when I saw the names of the lawyers at the top of the
Court’s opinion, I was not surprised. Tim Fraelich and Angela Gott are
superstar trademark lawyers at Jones Day in Cleveland. Their mentor, Rob
Ducatman, is the best in the business. They are masters at trademark
litigation, and they have an excellent, lean team that is built on trust
through many years of working together. Their winning descriptive fair
use strategy is a model for all future fair use litigants to study.
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